A New Defence against the Problem of Evil
In this paper, I propose a defence against the problem of evil. This defence does not involve either free will or soul-making, but, rather, is intended as a replacement for the traditional theodicies. The defence will have two components: firstly, a proposal for why a good God would not intervene to...
| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Drawer...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
MDPI
2024
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| In: |
Religions
Year: 2024, Volume: 15, Issue: 10 |
| Further subjects: | B
Sovereignty
B Theodicy B problem of evil B Species |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (kostenfrei) Volltext (kostenfrei) |
| Summary: | In this paper, I propose a defence against the problem of evil. This defence does not involve either free will or soul-making, but, rather, is intended as a replacement for the traditional theodicies. The defence will have two components: firstly, a proposal for why a good God would not intervene to eliminate the evil (natural or moral) in the world; and second, a proposal for why a good God would need to allow evil to exist in the world in the first place. I identify four desiderata for defences against the problem of evil and I argue that this new defence achieves all of these at least as well as traditional defences involving free will and/or soul-making. |
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| ISSN: | 2077-1444 |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: Religions
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.3390/rel15101149 |