Sect, Subsidy, and Sacrifice: An Economist's View of Ultra-Orthodox Jews
The Israeli Ultra-Orthodox population doubles each seventeen years. With 60 % of prime aged males attending Yeshiva rather than working, that community is rapidly outgrowing its resources. Why do fathers with families in poverty choose Yeshiva over work? Draft deferments subsidize Yeshiva attendanc...
| Main Author: | |
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| Corporate Author: | |
| Format: | Electronic Book |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| WorldCat: | WorldCat |
| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
Cambridge, Mass
Oxford Univ. Press
August 1998
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| In: |
The quarterly journal of economics
Year: 1998, Volume: 115, Issue: 3, Pages: 905-953 |
| Series/Journal: | NBER working paper series
no. w6715 |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (kostenfrei) Volltext (kostenfrei) |
| Summary: | The Israeli Ultra-Orthodox population doubles each seventeen years. With 60 % of prime aged males attending Yeshiva rather than working, that community is rapidly outgrowing its resources. Why do fathers with families in poverty choose Yeshiva over work? Draft deferments subsidize Yeshiva attendance, yet attendance typically continues long after they are draft exempt. We explain this puzzle with a club good model in which Yeshiva attendance signals commitment to the community. Subsidizing membership in a club with sacrifice as an entry requirement induces increased sacrifice, compounding the distortion and dissipating the subsidy. Policies treating members and potential entrants equally are Pareto improving. The analysis may generalize to other by increasing the stringency of prohibitions and sacrifice |
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| Format: | Mode of access: World Wide Web. System requirements: Adobe [Acrobat] Reader required for PDF files. |
| ISSN: | 1531-4650 |
| Access: | Open Access |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: The quarterly journal of economics
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.3386/w6715 |