Sect, Subsidy, and Sacrifice: An Economist's View of Ultra-Orthodox Jews

The Israeli Ultra-Orthodox population doubles each seventeen years. With 60 % of prime aged males attending Yeshiva rather than working, that community is rapidly outgrowing its resources. Why do fathers with families in poverty choose Yeshiva over work? Draft deferments subsidize Yeshiva attendanc...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Berman, Eli 1960- (Author)
Corporate Author: National Bureau of Economic Research (Other)
Format: Electronic Book
Language:English
Check availability: HBZ Gateway
WorldCat: WorldCat
Fernleihe:Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste
Published: Cambridge, Mass Oxford Univ. Press August 1998
In: The quarterly journal of economics
Year: 1998, Volume: 115, Issue: 3, Pages: 905-953
Series/Journal:NBER working paper series no. w6715
Online Access: Volltext (kostenfrei)
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520 |a The Israeli Ultra-Orthodox population doubles each seventeen years. With 60 % of prime aged males attending Yeshiva rather than working, that community is rapidly outgrowing its resources. Why do fathers with families in poverty choose Yeshiva over work? Draft deferments subsidize Yeshiva attendance, yet attendance typically continues long after they are draft exempt. We explain this puzzle with a club good model in which Yeshiva attendance signals commitment to the community. Subsidizing membership in a club with sacrifice as an entry requirement induces increased sacrifice, compounding the distortion and dissipating the subsidy. Policies treating members and potential entrants equally are Pareto improving. The analysis may generalize to other by increasing the stringency of prohibitions and sacrifice 
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