Should inherent human dignity be considered intrinsically heuristic?
What are “human rights” supposed to protect? According to most human rights doctrines, including most notably the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), human rights aim to protect “human dignity.” But what this concept amounts to and what its source is remain unclear. According to Glenn Hugh...
| Published in: | Journal of religious ethics |
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| Main Author: | |
| Format: | Electronic/Print Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Drawer...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
Wiley
[2014]
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| In: |
Journal of religious ethics
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| Standardized Subjects / Keyword chains: | B
Human rights
/ Human dignity
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| RelBib Classification: | NCC Social ethics VA Philosophy |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (doi) |
| Parallel Edition: | Electronic
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| Summary: | What are “human rights” supposed to protect? According to most human rights doctrines, including most notably the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), human rights aim to protect “human dignity.” But what this concept amounts to and what its source is remain unclear. According to Glenn Hughes (2011), human rights theorists ought to consider human dignity as an “intrinsically heuristic concept,” whose content is partially understood but is not fully determined. In this comment, I criticize Hughes's account. On my view, understanding inherent human dignity as an intrinsically heuristic concept tethers it to an “indeterminateness of sense,” which leaves it open to exploitation from theorists unsympathetic to the moral salience of rights and what rights are supposed to protect. |
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| ISSN: | 0384-9694 |
| Reference: | Kritik von "The concept of dignity in the universal declaration of human rights (2011)"
Kritik in "Response to Ranganathan (2014)" |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: Journal of religious ethics
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1111/jore.12081 |