Transworld depravity and divine omniscience

This paper argues against the sufficiency of Alvin Plantinga's free will defense, as presented in God, freedom, and evil as a response to the logical problem of evil. I begin by introducing the fundamental issues present in the problem of evil and proceed to present Plantinga's response. N...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:International journal for philosophy of religion
Main Author: Meslar, Sean (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: Springer Science + Business Media B. V 2015
In: International journal for philosophy of religion
Further subjects:B Free Will
B FREE will & determinism
B Omniscience
B Evil
B God Omniscience
B GOOD & evil
B Plantinga, Alvin
B Will
B Plantinga
B Transworld depravity
Online Access: Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)
Description
Summary:This paper argues against the sufficiency of Alvin Plantinga's free will defense, as presented in God, freedom, and evil as a response to the logical problem of evil. I begin by introducing the fundamental issues present in the problem of evil and proceed to present Plantinga's response. Next, I argue that, despite the argument's wide acceptance in the field, a central notion to the defense, transworld depravity, is internally inconsistent and that attempts to resolve the problem would result in an abandonment of the original terms of the discussion. Finally, I consider some potential alternatives for a free will defense beyond the one presented by Plantinga and conclude that the logical problem of evil may have more worth as a philosophical topic than has been thought in recent years.
ISSN:1572-8684
Contains:Enthalten in: International journal for philosophy of religion
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1007/s11153-014-9499-5