Pragmatic decisions about god from different points of view: the costs of apostasy
Pascal, with his famous wager, argued in favour of religious practice and faith by appeal to expected payoffs. Here I discuss an asymmetry in similar pragmatic arguments for decisions about God. I begin with the observation that apostates (those who abandon religious practice and/or belief) pay cost...
Main Author: | |
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Format: | Electronic Article |
Language: | English |
Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Published: |
Springer Nature B. V
[2016]
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In: |
International journal for philosophy of religion
Year: 2016, Volume: 80, Issue: 2, Pages: 103-113 |
Further subjects: | B
Bereavement
B BELIEF & doubt B Pascal B Apostasy B God B Wager B Pragmatics |
Online Access: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
Summary: | Pascal, with his famous wager, argued in favour of religious practice and faith by appeal to expected payoffs. Here I discuss an asymmetry in similar pragmatic arguments for decisions about God. I begin with the observation that apostates (those who abandon religious practice and/or belief) pay costs not shared by those who never adopt a religion in the first place. Noticing this asymmetry shows these arguments from a new perspective and may also contribute to an explanation of the endurance of religion. |
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ISSN: | 1572-8684 |
Contains: | Enthalten in: International journal for philosophy of religion
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s11153-015-9555-9 |