Conceivability, possibility and the resurrection of material beings
In his 1998 postscript to 'The Possibility of Resurrection' Peter van Inwagen argues that the scenario he describes by which God might resurrect a human organism, even though probably not true (cf. van Inwagen in, The possibility of resurrection and other essays in Christian apologetics, W...
| Published in: | International journal for philosophy of religion |
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| Main Author: | |
| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
Springer Science + Business Media B. V
[2016]
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| In: |
International journal for philosophy of religion
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| Further subjects: | B
Resurrection
B Modal epistemology B Death B Metaphysics B Philosophical Theology B Modality B Survival B Animalism B POSSIBILITY of Resurrection & Other Essays in Christian Apologetics, The (Book) B VAN Inwagen, Peter |
| Online Access: |
Presumably Free Access Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Summary: | In his 1998 postscript to 'The Possibility of Resurrection' Peter van Inwagen argues that the scenario he describes by which God might resurrect a human organism, even though probably not true (cf. van Inwagen in, The possibility of resurrection and other essays in Christian apologetics, Westview Press, Boulder, 1998b, p. 51), is still conceivable and, consequently, 'serves to establish a possibility' (van Inwagen in, The possibility of resurrection and other essays in Christian apologetics, Westview Press, Boulder, 1998b, p. 51), namely, the metaphysical possibility of the resurrection of material beings. Van Inwagen, however, has also argued in favour of 'modal scepticism' [van Inwagen in, God, knowledge and mystery: essays in philosophical theology, Cornell University Press, Ithaca 1995b, pp. 11-12; van Inwagen in, Philos Stud 92:67-84 (69), 1998a]. That is, he thinks that we should limit all our claims about what is possible to 'ordinary propositions about everyday matters' (van Inwagen in, Philos Stud 92:67-84 (76), 1998a). In this paper I argue that van Inwagen's modal argument as found in 'The Possibility of Resurrection' (van Inwagen in, The possibility of resurrection and other essays in Christian apologetics, Westview Press, Boulder, 1998b) is inconsistent with his modal scepticism as found in 'Modal Epistemology' (van Inwagen in, Philos Stud 92:67-84, 1998a). In consequence, I argue that, given his modal scepticism, the task van Inwagen set himself in 'The Possibility of Resurrection' (to establish the possibility of the Resurrection) has not been achieved. |
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| ISSN: | 1572-8684 |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: International journal for philosophy of religion
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s11153-016-9573-2 |