A Priori Skepticism and the KK Thesis

In a previous article, I argued against the widespread reluctance of philosophers to treat skeptical challenges to our a priori knowledge of necessary truths with the same seriousness as skeptical challenges to our a posteriori knowledge of contingent truths. Hamid Vahid has recently offered several...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Published in:International journal for the study of skepticism
Main Author: Beebe, James R.
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
Check availability: HBZ Gateway
Journals Online & Print:
Drawer...
Published: 2015
In:International journal for the study of skepticism
Year: 2015, Volume: 5, Issue: 4, Pages: 315-326
Further subjects:B Skepticism a priori skepticism second-order knowledge kk thesis
Online Access: Volltext (Verlag)
Description
Summary:In a previous article, I argued against the widespread reluctance of philosophers to treat skeptical challenges to our a priori knowledge of necessary truths with the same seriousness as skeptical challenges to our a posteriori knowledge of contingent truths. Hamid Vahid has recently offered several reasons for thinking the unequal treatment of these two kinds of skepticism is justified, one of which is a priori skepticism’s seeming dependence upon the widely scorned kk thesis. In the present article, I defend a priori skepticism against Vahid’s criticisms.
ISSN:2210-5700
Contains:In: International journal for the study of skepticism
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1163/22105700-04010005