Wittgenstein on Mathematics and Certainties
This paper aims to contribute to the debate over epistemic versus non-epistemic readings of the ‘hinges’ in Wittgenstein’s On Certainty. I follow Marie McGinn’s and Daniele Moyal-Sharrock’s lead in developing an analogy between mathematical sentences and certainties, and using the former as a model...
| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Published: |
2016
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| In: |
International journal for the study of skepticism
Year: 2016, Volume: 6, Issue: 2/3, Pages: 120-142 |
| Standardized Subjects / Keyword chains: | B
Wittgenstein, Ludwig 1889-1951, Über Gewissheit
/ Theorem
/ Certitude
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| Further subjects: | B
Wittgenstein
Marie McGinn
Daniele Moyal-Sharrock
mathematics
certainties
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| Online Access: |
Volltext (Publisher) |
| Summary: | This paper aims to contribute to the debate over epistemic versus non-epistemic readings of the ‘hinges’ in Wittgenstein’s On Certainty. I follow Marie McGinn’s and Daniele Moyal-Sharrock’s lead in developing an analogy between mathematical sentences and certainties, and using the former as a model for the latter. However, I disagree with McGinn’s and Moyal-Sharrock’s interpretations concerning Wittgenstein’s views of both relata. I argue that mathematical sentences as well as certainties are true and are propositions; that some of them can be epistemically justified; that in some senses they are not prior to empirical knowledge; that they are not ineffable; and that their primary function is epistemic as much as it is semantic. |
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| Physical Description: | Online-Ressource |
| ISSN: | 2210-5700 |
| Contains: | In: International journal for the study of skepticism
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1163/22105700-00603004 |
