Perceptual Anti-Individualism and Skepticism
In “Perceptual Entitlement, Reliabilism, and Scepticism,” Frank Barel explores some important and under-discussed questions regarding the relation between Tyler Burge’s views on perceptual entitlement, on the one hand, and the problem of skepticism, on the other. In this note, I would like to commen...
| Published in: | International journal for the study of skepticism |
|---|---|
| Main Author: | |
| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Drawer...
|
| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
Brill
2012
|
| In: |
International journal for the study of skepticism
|
| Further subjects: | B
Skepticism
anti-individualism
Burge
Stroud
Twin-Earth
verificationism
|
| Online Access: |
Volltext (Verlag) |
| Summary: | In “Perceptual Entitlement, Reliabilism, and Scepticism,” Frank Barel explores some important and under-discussed questions regarding the relation between Tyler Burge’s views on perceptual entitlement, on the one hand, and the problem of skepticism, on the other. In this note, I would like to comment on a couple of aspects of Barel’s article. First, I have my own take, different from Barel’s, on the question of whether we can sketch an a priori anti-skeptical argument proceeding from perceptual anti-individualism. Second, I discuss the question whether Barel’s “Rationalistic” anti-skeptical argument is successful. |
|---|---|
| ISSN: | 2210-5700 |
| Contains: | In: International journal for the study of skepticism
|
| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1163/22105700-02021068 |