The Animal in Epistemology
In this paper, I briefly summarize the nature of Wittgenstein’s ‘hinge certainties,’ showing how they radically differ from traditional basic beliefs in their being nonepistemic, grammatical, nonpropositional, and enacted. I claim that it is these very features that enable hinge certainties to put a...
| Auteur principal: | |
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| Type de support: | Électronique Article |
| Langue: | Anglais |
| Vérifier la disponibilité: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | En cours de chargement...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Publié: |
Brill
2016
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| Dans: |
International journal for the study of skepticism
Année: 2016, Volume: 6, Numéro: 2/3, Pages: 97-119 |
| Sujets non-standardisés: | B
Wittgenstein
On Certainty
epistemology
regress problem
basic beliefs
hinge certainty
knowledge
enactivism
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| Accès en ligne: |
Accès probablement gratuit Volltext (Verlag) |
| Résumé: | In this paper, I briefly summarize the nature of Wittgenstein’s ‘hinge certainties,’ showing how they radically differ from traditional basic beliefs in their being nonepistemic, grammatical, nonpropositional, and enacted. I claim that it is these very features that enable hinge certainties to put a logical stop to justification, and thereby solve the regress problem of basic beliefs. This is a ground-breaking achievement—worthy of calling On Certainty Wittgenstein’s ‘third masterpiece.’ As I go along, I question some differing interpretations and respond to some objections from fellow-readers of On Certainty: Duncan Pritchard, Michael Williams, and Crispin Wright. |
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| ISSN: | 2210-5700 |
| Contient: | In: International journal for the study of skepticism
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1163/22105700-00603003 |