Contrastivism and Skepticism
Recently, Jonathan Schaffer (and others) has defended a contrastivist analysis of knowledge. By appealing to his account, he has attempted to steer a path between skepticism and Moore-style antiskepticism: much like sensitivity theorists and contextualists, he offers significant concessions to, but...
1. VerfasserIn: | |
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Medienart: | Elektronisch Aufsatz |
Sprache: | Englisch |
Verfügbarkeit prüfen: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Veröffentlicht: |
Brill
2012
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In: |
International journal for the study of skepticism
Jahr: 2012, Band: 2, Heft: 1, Seiten: 51-58 |
weitere Schlagwörter: | B
Skepticism
contrastivism
knowledge
closure
Schaffer
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Online Zugang: |
Volltext (Verlag) |
Zusammenfassung: | Recently, Jonathan Schaffer (and others) has defended a contrastivist analysis of knowledge. By appealing to his account, he has attempted to steer a path between skepticism and Moore-style antiskepticism: much like sensitivity theorists and contextualists, he offers significant concessions to, but ultimately rejects, both. In this essay I suggest that in fact Schaffer ends up succumbing to skepticism. |
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ISSN: | 2210-5700 |
Enthält: | In: International journal for the study of skepticism
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1163/221057011X588019 |