In Defense of Piecemeal Skepticism
Anthony Brueckner and Jon Altschul suggest a version of skepticism according to which the skeptic posits a distinct skeptical hypothesis for each external world proposition that a person claims to know. In a recent issue of this journal, Eric Yang argues against this piecemeal approach. In this note...
| Published in: | International journal for the study of skepticism |
|---|---|
| Main Author: | |
| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Drawer...
|
| Published: |
Brill
2017
|
| In: |
International journal for the study of skepticism
Year: 2017, Volume: 7, Issue: 1, Pages: 53-56 |
| Standardized Subjects / Keyword chains: | B
Outside world
/ Fragment
/ Scepticism
|
| Further subjects: | B
external world skepticism
piecemeal skepticism
skeptical hypothesis
brains in a vat
|
| Online Access: |
Volltext (Verlag) |
| Summary: | Anthony Brueckner and Jon Altschul suggest a version of skepticism according to which the skeptic posits a distinct skeptical hypothesis for each external world proposition that a person claims to know. In a recent issue of this journal, Eric Yang argues against this piecemeal approach. In this note, I show that Yang’s argument against piecemeal skepticism is fallacious. |
|---|---|
| ISSN: | 2210-5700 |
| Contains: | In: International journal for the study of skepticism
|
| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1163/22105700-006011231 |