On the Standards-Variantist Solution to Skepticism
The skeptical puzzle consists of three independently plausible yet jointly inconsistent claims: (A) S knows a certain ordinary proposition op; (B) S does not know the denial of a certain skeptical hypothesis sh; and (C) S knows that op only if S knows that not-sh. The variantist solution (to the ske...
Published in: | International journal for the study of skepticism |
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Main Author: | |
Format: | Electronic Article |
Language: | English |
Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Published: |
Brill
2017
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In: |
International journal for the study of skepticism
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Standardized Subjects / Keyword chains: | B
Scepticism
/ Epistemic modal logic
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Further subjects: | B
epistemic contextualism
standards variantism
position variantism
skepticism
pragmatic penetration
intellectualism
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Online Access: |
Volltext (Verlag) |
Summary: | The skeptical puzzle consists of three independently plausible yet jointly inconsistent claims: (A) S knows a certain ordinary proposition op; (B) S does not know the denial of a certain skeptical hypothesis sh; and (C) S knows that op only if S knows that not-sh. The variantist solution (to the skeptical puzzle) claims that (A) and not-(B) are true in the ordinary context, but false in the skeptical one. Epistemic contextualism has offered a standards-variantist solution, which is the most prominent variantist solution on the market. In this paper, I argue that the standards-variantist solution in general (and the contextualist solution in particular) is epistemically uninteresting. Proponents of the variantist solution should opt for the position-variantist solution instead. I will discuss some important implications of my findings. |
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ISSN: | 2210-5700 |
Contains: | In: International journal for the study of skepticism
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1163/22105700-00001224 |