Beyond Psychologism and Anti-Psychologism
What is special about successful action explanation is that it reveals what the agent saw in her action. Most contemporary philosophers assume that this amounts to explanation in terms of the reason for which the agent acted. They also assume that such explanations conform to a realist picture of ex...
| Published in: | Ethical theory and moral practice |
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| Main Author: | |
| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Drawer...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
Springer Science + Business Media B. V
[2015]
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| In: |
Ethical theory and moral practice
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| RelBib Classification: | NCB Personal ethics VA Philosophy ZD Psychology |
| Further subjects: | B
Reasons explanation
B Simulation B Reasons B Action explanation B Rationalization |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (Verlag) Volltext (doi) |
| Summary: | What is special about successful action explanation is that it reveals what the agent saw in her action. Most contemporary philosophers assume that this amounts to explanation in terms of the reason for which the agent acted. They also assume that such explanations conform to a realist picture of explanation. What is disputed is whether the reason is a psychological state (Psychologism) or a normative state of affairs (Anti-Psychologism). I argue that neither psychological states nor their contents suffice to make actions intelligible in the right way (such theories fail to meet what I call the Reasonableness Constraint), while Anti-Psychologism cant explain acting on bad reasons (it fails the Bad Reasons Constraint). The alternative that I propose, Proceduralism, has it that explaining an action requires simulating the agents practical deliberation. On this view, explanation is not grounded in reasons, and thereby avoids the problems with bad reasons that Anti-Psychologism faces. Instead, in simulating to the same conclusion as the agent, the explainer comes to see what the agent saw in her action, thereby satisfying the Reasonableness Constraint. Proceduralism requires giving up on the assumption that the reason for which the agent acts explains the action and on the realist picture of action explanation. In addition, it accounts for the incomprehension that explainers experience when they encounter alien psychologies - psychologies that are deeply different from their own. |
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| ISSN: | 1572-8447 |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: Ethical theory and moral practice
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s10677-015-9577-5 |