Emotional Regulation and Responsibility
I argue that ones responsibility for ones emotions has a two-fold structure: one bears direct responsibility for emotions insofar as they are the upshot of first-order evaluative judgements concerning reasons of fit; and one bears derivative responsibility for them insofar as they are consequences...
| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Published: |
[2015]
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| In: |
Ethical theory and moral practice
Year: 2015, Volume: 18, Issue: 3, Pages: 487-500 |
| RelBib Classification: | NCB Personal ethics ZD Psychology |
| Further subjects: | B
Reasons
B Regulation B Emotion B Responsibility |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (Publisher) Volltext (doi) |
| Summary: | I argue that ones responsibility for ones emotions has a two-fold structure: one bears direct responsibility for emotions insofar as they are the upshot of first-order evaluative judgements concerning reasons of fit; and one bears derivative responsibility for them insofar as they are consequences of activities of emotional self-regulation, which can reflect ones take on second-order reasons concerning the strategic, prudential, or moral desirability of undergoing a particular emotion in a particular context. |
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| ISSN: | 1572-8447 |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: Ethical theory and moral practice
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s10677-014-9535-7 |
