Frames, Choice-Reversal, and Consent
Recently Jason Hanna has argued that a particular type of susceptibility to framing effectsnamely, the tendency to reverse ones choice between certain logically equivalent framesinvalidates actual tokens of consent. Here I argue that this claim is false: proneness to choice-reversal per se betwee...
| Publié dans: | Ethical theory and moral practice |
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| Auteur principal: | |
| Type de support: | Électronique Article |
| Langue: | Anglais |
| Vérifier la disponibilité: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | En cours de chargement...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Publié: |
Springer Science + Business Media B. V
[2015]
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| Dans: |
Ethical theory and moral practice
Année: 2015, Volume: 18, Numéro: 5, Pages: 1049-1057 |
| RelBib Classification: | NCA Éthique ZD Psychologie |
| Sujets non-standardisés: | B
Rights
B Consent B Framing effects B Autonomy |
| Accès en ligne: |
Volltext (Verlag) Volltext (doi) |
| Résumé: | Recently Jason Hanna has argued that a particular type of susceptibility to framing effectsnamely, the tendency to reverse ones choice between certain logically equivalent framesinvalidates actual tokens of consent. Here I argue that this claim is false: proneness to choice-reversal per se between the relevant types of frames does not invalidate consent. |
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| ISSN: | 1572-8447 |
| Contient: | Enthalten in: Ethical theory and moral practice
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s10677-015-9581-9 |