It is better to be ignorant of our moral enhancement: A reply to Zambrano
In a recent issue of Bioethics, I argued that compulsory moral bioenhancement should be administered covertly. Alexander Zambrano has criticized this argument on two fronts. First, contrary to my claim, Zambrano claims that the prevention of ultimate harm by covert moral bioenhancement fails to meet...
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| Contributors: | |
| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Drawer...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
Wiley-Blackwell
[2020]
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| In: |
Bioethics
Year: 2020, Volume: 34, Issue: 2, Pages: 190-194 |
| RelBib Classification: | NCH Medical ethics ZC Politics in general |
| Further subjects: | B
public health ethic
B Quarantine B Framing effects B Autonomy B Enhancement B moral epistemology |
| Online Access: |
Presumably Free Access Volltext (Verlag) Volltext (doi) |
| Summary: | In a recent issue of Bioethics, I argued that compulsory moral bioenhancement should be administered covertly. Alexander Zambrano has criticized this argument on two fronts. First, contrary to my claim, Zambrano claims that the prevention of ultimate harm by covert moral bioenhancement fails to meet conditions for permissible liberty-restricting public health interventions. Second, contrary to my claim, Zambrano claims that covert moral bioenhancement undermines autonomy to a greater degree than does overt moral bioenhancement. In this paper, I rebut both of these arguments, then finish by noting important avenues of research that Zambrano’s arguments motivate. |
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| ISSN: | 1467-8519 |
| Reference: | Kritik von "Covert moral bioenhancement, public health, and autonomy (2019)"
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| Contains: | Enthalten in: Bioethics
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1111/bioe.12685 |