Rightness, Parsimony, and Consequentialism: A Response to Peterson
This paper argues against Martin Peterson in favour of the standard view of rightness, according to which rightness does not come in degrees. It begins (section 1) with a defence of the standard view against the charge that it is committed to deontic leaps. It goes on (section 2) to claim that g...
| Published in: | Ethical theory and moral practice |
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| Main Author: | |
| Contributors: | |
| Format: | Electronic Review |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Drawer...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
Springer Science + Business Media B. V
[2016]
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| In: |
Ethical theory and moral practice
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| RelBib Classification: | NCA Ethics VA Philosophy |
| Further subjects: | B
Book review
B Deontology B Rationality B Rightness B Consequentialism B Peterson, Martin |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (Verlag) Volltext (doi) |
| Summary: | This paper argues against Martin Peterson in favour of the standard view of rightness, according to which rightness does not come in degrees. It begins (section 1) with a defence of the standard view against the charge that it is committed to deontic leaps. It goes on (section 2) to claim that greater conceptual parsimony would allow Peterson to avoid certain problems involving equality and related matters that arise out of his conception of moral value, and that Peterson should take the same instrumentalist attitude towards the norms of practical rationality as he does towards the norms of common-sense morality. The paper closes (section 3) with some doubts about Petersons programme of consequentialization and its alleged advantages. |
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| ISSN: | 1572-8447 |
| Reference: | Kritik in "The Dimensions of Consequentialism (2016)"
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| Contains: | Enthalten in: Ethical theory and moral practice
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s10677-015-9671-8 |