Parity and Comparability - a Concern Regarding Changs Chaining Argument
According to Ruth Chang the three standard positive value relations: better than, worse than and equally good do not fully exhaust the conceptual space for positive value relations. According to her, there is room for a fourth positive value relation, which she calls parity. Her argument for...
| Published in: | Ethical theory and moral practice |
|---|---|
| Main Author: | |
| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Drawer...
|
| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
Springer Science + Business Media B. V
[2016]
|
| In: |
Ethical theory and moral practice
|
| RelBib Classification: | NCA Ethics VB Hermeneutics; Philosophy |
| Further subjects: | B
Begging the question
B Comparability B Value relations B Chang B Comparisons B Trichotomy B Vagueness B Parity |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (Verlag) Volltext (doi) |
| Summary: | According to Ruth Chang the three standard positive value relations: better than, worse than and equally good do not fully exhaust the conceptual space for positive value relations. According to her, there is room for a fourth positive value relation, which she calls parity. Her argument for parity comes in three parts. First, she argues that there are items that are not related by the standard three value relations. Second, that these items are not incomparable, and third, that the phenomena she has focused on are not due to the vagueness of the comparative predicates (i.e., that it is indeterminate which of the standard value relations that holds). This paper focuses on the second part of the argument and an objection is presented. By assuming the Small Unidimensional Difference Principle, which is a key premise for the second part of the argument, Changs argument could be accused of begging the question. More so, by assuming this principle, the space for incomparability gets severely limited. If these worries are justified, then Changs argument for parity as a fourth form of comparability is unsuccessful. |
|---|---|
| ISSN: | 1572-8447 |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: Ethical theory and moral practice
|
| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s10677-015-9621-5 |