Empirical Adequacy and Virtue Ethics
Situationists contend that virtue ethics is empirically inadequate. However, it is my contention that there is much confusion over what empirical adequacy or empirical inadequacy actually means in this context. My aim in this paper is to clarify the meanings of empirical adequacy in order to see...
| Published in: | Ethical theory and moral practice |
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| Main Author: | |
| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Drawer...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
Springer Science + Business Media B. V
[2016]
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| In: |
Ethical theory and moral practice
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| RelBib Classification: | NCA Ethics VA Philosophy |
| Further subjects: | B
John Doris
B Situationism B Explanation B Virtue Ethics B Empirical adequacy |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (Verlag) Volltext (doi) |
| Summary: | Situationists contend that virtue ethics is empirically inadequate. However, it is my contention that there is much confusion over what empirical adequacy or empirical inadequacy actually means in this context. My aim in this paper is to clarify the meanings of empirical adequacy in order to see to what extent virtue ethics might fail to meet this standard. I argue that the situationists frequently misconstrue the empirical commitments of virtue ethics. More importantly, depending on what we mean by empirical adequacy, either virtue ethics has no need to be empirically adequate or where it does have such a need, the psychological evidence fails to show that it is empirically inadequate. An additional contribution the paper intends to make is to provide a more detailed discussion of the explanatory nature of virtue ethics. |
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| ISSN: | 1572-8447 |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: Ethical theory and moral practice
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s10677-015-9623-3 |