Empirical Adequacy and Virtue Ethics
Situationists contend that virtue ethics is empirically inadequate. However, it is my contention that there is much confusion over what empirical adequacy or empirical inadequacy actually means in this context. My aim in this paper is to clarify the meanings of empirical adequacy in order to see...
| Publié dans: | Ethical theory and moral practice |
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| Auteur principal: | |
| Type de support: | Électronique Article |
| Langue: | Anglais |
| Vérifier la disponibilité: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | En cours de chargement...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Publié: |
Springer Science + Business Media B. V
[2016]
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| Dans: |
Ethical theory and moral practice
Année: 2016, Volume: 19, Numéro: 2, Pages: 343-357 |
| RelBib Classification: | NCA Éthique VA Philosophie |
| Sujets non-standardisés: | B
John Doris
B Situationism B Explanation B Virtue Ethics B Empirical adequacy |
| Accès en ligne: |
Volltext (Verlag) Volltext (doi) |
| Résumé: | Situationists contend that virtue ethics is empirically inadequate. However, it is my contention that there is much confusion over what empirical adequacy or empirical inadequacy actually means in this context. My aim in this paper is to clarify the meanings of empirical adequacy in order to see to what extent virtue ethics might fail to meet this standard. I argue that the situationists frequently misconstrue the empirical commitments of virtue ethics. More importantly, depending on what we mean by empirical adequacy, either virtue ethics has no need to be empirically adequate or where it does have such a need, the psychological evidence fails to show that it is empirically inadequate. An additional contribution the paper intends to make is to provide a more detailed discussion of the explanatory nature of virtue ethics. |
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| ISSN: | 1572-8447 |
| Contient: | Enthalten in: Ethical theory and moral practice
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s10677-015-9623-3 |