Belief and the Error Theory

A new kind of debate about the normative error theory has emerged. Whereas longstanding debates have fixed on the error theory’s plausibility, this new debate concerns the theory’s believability. Bart Streumer (2013) is the chief proponent of the error theory’s unbelievability. In this brief essay,...

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Bibliographic Details
Authors: Forcehimes, Andrew T. (Author) ; Talisse, Robert B. 1970- (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
Check availability: HBZ Gateway
Interlibrary Loan:Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany)
Published: [2016]
In: Ethical theory and moral practice
Year: 2016, Volume: 19, Issue: 4, Pages: 849-856
RelBib Classification:NCA Ethics
VA Philosophy
Further subjects:B Belief Formation
B Error Theory
B Reasons
B Bart Streumer
B Belief Maintenance
Online Access: Volltext (Publisher)
Volltext (doi)
Description
Summary:A new kind of debate about the normative error theory has emerged. Whereas longstanding debates have fixed on the error theory’s plausibility, this new debate concerns the theory’s believability. Bart Streumer (2013) is the chief proponent of the error theory’s unbelievability. In this brief essay, we argue that Streumer’s argument prevails against extant critiques, and then press a criticism of our own.
ISSN:1572-8447
Contains:Enthalten in: Ethical theory and moral practice
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1007/s10677-016-9707-8