Reactive Attitudes, Forgiveness, and the Second-Person Standpoint
Philosophers discussing forgiveness have usually been split between those who think that forgiveness is typically virtuous, even when the wrongdoer doesnt repent, and those who think that, for forgiveness to be virtuous, certain pre-conditions must be satisfied. I argue that Darwalls second-person...
| Published in: | Ethical theory and moral practice |
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| Main Author: | |
| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Drawer...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
Springer Science + Business Media B. V
[2016]
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| In: |
Ethical theory and moral practice
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| RelBib Classification: | NCB Personal ethics VA Philosophy |
| Further subjects: | B
Forgiveness
B Darwall B Reactive attitudes B Second-person standpoint |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (Verlag) Volltext (doi) |
| Summary: | Philosophers discussing forgiveness have usually been split between those who think that forgiveness is typically virtuous, even when the wrongdoer doesnt repent, and those who think that, for forgiveness to be virtuous, certain pre-conditions must be satisfied. I argue that Darwalls second-personal account of morality offers significant theoretical support for the latter view. I argue that if, as Darwall claims, reactive attitudes issue a demand, this demand needs to be adequately answered for forgiveness to be warranted. It follows that we should reject the thesis that unconditional forgiveness is appropriate in the absence of repentance. |
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| ISSN: | 1572-8447 |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: Ethical theory and moral practice
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s10677-016-9740-7 |