The Objectivity of Ordinary Life

Metaethics tends to take for granted a bare Democritean world of atoms and the void, and then worry about how the human world that we all know can possibly be related to it or justified in its terms. I draw on Wittgenstein to show how completely upside-down this picture is, and make some moves towar...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Ethical theory and moral practice
Main Author: Chappell, Sophie Grace 1964- (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: Springer Science + Business Media B. V [2017]
In: Ethical theory and moral practice
RelBib Classification:NBD Doctrine of Creation
NBE Anthropology
NCA Ethics
VA Philosophy
Further subjects:B Moral Realism
B Behaviourism
B Moral Philosophy
B Moral subjectivism
B Thick Concepts
B Problem of other minds
B Metaethics
B Wittgenstein
Online Access: Presumably Free Access
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Summary:Metaethics tends to take for granted a bare Democritean world of atoms and the void, and then worry about how the human world that we all know can possibly be related to it or justified in its terms. I draw on Wittgenstein to show how completely upside-down this picture is, and make some moves towards turning it the right way up again. There may be a use for something like the bare-Democritean model in some of the sciences, but the picture has no standing as the basic objective truth about the world; if anything has that standing, it is ordinary life. I conclude with some thoughts about how the notion of bare, “thin” perception of non-evaluative reality feeds a number of philosophical pathologies, such as behaviourism, and show how a “thicker”, more value-laden, understanding of our perceptions of the world can be therapeutic against them.
ISSN:1572-8447
Contains:Enthalten in: Ethical theory and moral practice
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1007/s10677-017-9793-2