The Logical Problem of the Trinity and the Strong Theory of Relative Identity
In this paper, I consider the philosophical consequences of one tradition in Trinitarian theology, which emphasizes that each of the persons of the Trinity is wholly God. I pay special attention to Leftows claim that the persons of the Godhead must be divine in the same sense of the word divine a...
| Published in: | Sophia |
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| Main Author: | |
| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Drawer...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
Springer Netherlands
[2017]
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| In: |
Sophia
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| RelBib Classification: | FA Theology NBC Doctrine of God VB Hermeneutics; Philosophy |
| Further subjects: | B
Trinity
B Philosophical Theology B Identity B Logic |
| Online Access: |
Presumably Free Access Volltext (Verlag) Volltext (doi) |
| Summary: | In this paper, I consider the philosophical consequences of one tradition in Trinitarian theology, which emphasizes that each of the persons of the Trinity is wholly God. I pay special attention to Leftows claim that the persons of the Godhead must be divine in the same sense of the word divine as the Godhead itself. I argue that the existing philosophical account of the Trinity which best captures this view is what I have termed the Strong Theory of Relative Identity, first proposed Peter Geach. I then develop what I take to be the most pressing objection to this account of the Trinity, namely that it cannot be supplemented with a coherent model-theoretic semantics. I end with a suggestion for responding to this objection. |
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| ISSN: | 1873-930X |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: Sophia
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s11841-017-0612-y |