The Open Future, Free Will and Divine Assurance: responding to three common objections to the open view
In this essay I respond to three of the most forceful objections to the open view of the future. It is argued that a) open view advocates must deny bivalence; b) the open view offers no theodicy advantages over classical theism; and c) the open view cant assure believers that God can work all thing...
| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
University of Innsbruck in cooperation with the John Hick Centre for Philosophy of Religion at the University of Birmingham
[2015]
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| In: |
European journal for philosophy of religion
Year: 2015, Volume: 7, Issue: 3, Pages: 207-222 |
| Standardized Subjects / Keyword chains: | B
Free will
/ Future
/ God
/ Plot
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| RelBib Classification: | AB Philosophy of religion; criticism of religion; atheism NBC Doctrine of God |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (doi) Volltext (teilw. kostenfrei) |
| Summary: | In this essay I respond to three of the most forceful objections to the open view of the future. It is argued that a) open view advocates must deny bivalence; b) the open view offers no theodicy advantages over classical theism; and c) the open view cant assure believers that God can work all things to the better (Rom. 8:28). I argue that the first objection is premised on an inadequate assessment of future tensed propositions, the second is rooted in an inadequate assessment of free will, and the third is grounded in an inadequate assessment of Gods intelligence. |
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| Contains: | Enthalten in: European journal for philosophy of religion
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.24204/ejpr.v7i3.112 |