Complete Concept Molinism

A theoretically rigorous approach to the key problems of molinism leads to a clear distinction between semantic and metaphysical problems. Answers to semantic problems do not provide answers to metaphysical problems that arise from the theory of middle knowledge. The so-called ‘grounding objection’...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Brüntrup, Godehard 1957- (Author)
Contributors: Schneider, Ruben (Other)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: University of Innsbruck in cooperation with the John Hick Centre for Philosophy of Religion at the University of Birmingham [2013]
In: European journal for philosophy of religion
Year: 2013, Volume: 5, Issue: 1, Pages: 93-108
Online Access: Volltext (doi)
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Parallel Edition:Non-electronic
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Summary:A theoretically rigorous approach to the key problems of molinism leads to a clear distinction between semantic and metaphysical problems. Answers to semantic problems do not provide answers to metaphysical problems that arise from the theory of middle knowledge. The so-called ‘grounding objection’ to molinism raises a metaphysical problem. The most promising solution to it is a revised form of the traditional ‘essence solution’. Inspired by leibniz’s idea of a ‘notio completa’ (complete concept), we propose a mathematical model of ‘possibilistic’ (molinist) complete concepts. They ground middle knowledge within the very being of the agents themselves. molinist Complete Concepts can thus serve to reject consequence-style arguments against molinism. They also allow the molinist to safeguard a robustly libertarian notion of the ability to do otherwise.
Contains:Enthalten in: European journal for philosophy of religion
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.24204/ejpr.v5i1.251