Euthyphro's "Dilemma", Socrates' Daimonion and Plato's God

In this paper I start with the familiar accusation that divine command ethics faces a «Euthyphro dilemma». By looking at what Plato’s Euthyphro actually says, I argue that no such argument against divine-command ethics was Plato’s intention, and that, in any case, no such argument is cogent. I then...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:European journal for philosophy of religion
Main Author: Chappell, Timothy (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: University of Innsbruck in cooperation with the John Hick Centre for Philosophy of Religion at the University of Birmingham [2010]
In: European journal for philosophy of religion
Online Access: Volltext (doi)
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Summary:In this paper I start with the familiar accusation that divine command ethics faces a «Euthyphro dilemma». By looking at what Plato’s Euthyphro actually says, I argue that no such argument against divine-command ethics was Plato’s intention, and that, in any case, no such argument is cogent. I then explore the place of divine commands and inspiration in Plato’s thought more generally, arguing that Plato sees an important epistemic and practical role for both.
Contains:Enthalten in: European journal for philosophy of religion
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.24204/ejpr.v2i1.350