Modified Gaunilo-Type Objections Against Modal Ontological Arguments
Modal ontological arguments are often claimed to be immune to the «perfect island» objection of Gaunilo, because necessary existence does not apply to material, contingent things. But Gaunilos strategy can be reformulated: we can speak of non-contingent beings, like quasi-Gods or evil God. The pape...
| Published in: | European journal for philosophy of religion |
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| Main Author: | |
| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
University of Innsbruck in cooperation with the John Hick Centre for Philosophy of Religion at the University of Birmingham
[2012]
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| In: |
European journal for philosophy of religion
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| Online Access: |
Volltext (doi) Volltext (teilw. kostenfrei) |
| Parallel Edition: | Non-electronic
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| Summary: | Modal ontological arguments are often claimed to be immune to the «perfect island» objection of Gaunilo, because necessary existence does not apply to material, contingent things. But Gaunilos strategy can be reformulated: we can speak of non-contingent beings, like quasi-Gods or evil God. The paper is intended to show that we can construct ontological arguments for the existence of such beings, and that those arguments are equally plausible as theistic modal argument. This result does not show that this argument is fallacious, but it shows that it is dialectically ineffective as an argument for theism. |
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| Contains: | Enthalten in: European journal for philosophy of religion
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.24204/ejpr.v4i2.299 |