God's Extended Mind
The traditional doctrine of divine omniscience ascribes to God the fully exercised power to know all truths. but why is Gods excellence with respect to knowing not treated on a par with his excellence with respect to doing, where the latter requires only that God have the (exercised or unexercised)...
| Published in: | European journal for philosophy of religion |
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| Main Author: | |
| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
University of Innsbruck in cooperation with the John Hick Centre for Philosophy of Religion at the University of Birmingham
[2013]
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| In: |
European journal for philosophy of religion
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| Online Access: |
Volltext (doi) Volltext (teilw. kostenfrei) |
| Summary: | The traditional doctrine of divine omniscience ascribes to God the fully exercised power to know all truths. but why is Gods excellence with respect to knowing not treated on a par with his excellence with respect to doing, where the latter requires only that God have the (exercised or unexercised) power to do all things? The prima facie problem with divine omni-knowledgeability - roughly, being able to know whatever one wants to know whenever one wants to know it - is that knowledge (whether occurrent or dispositional) requires an internal representation, whereas mere knowledgeability does not. I argue to the contrary that knowledge does not require an internal representation, and that even if it did, an omni-knowledgeable God would satisfy this requirement. omni-knowledgeability therefore represents a distinct understanding of Gods cognitive excellence while satisfying the traditional insistence on full omniscience. |
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| Contains: | Enthalten in: European journal for philosophy of religion
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.24204/ejpr.v5i1.245 |