Molinism and Theological Compatibilism
In a series of recent papers John martin Fischer argues that the so- called molinist solution to the problem of reconciling divine omniscience with human freedom does not offer such a solution at all. Instead, he maintains, molina simply presupposes theological compatibilism. However, Fischer constr...
| Auteur principal: | |
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| Type de support: | Électronique Article |
| Langue: | Anglais |
| Vérifier la disponibilité: | HBZ Gateway |
| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Publié: |
University of Innsbruck in cooperation with the John Hick Centre for Philosophy of Religion at the University of Birmingham
[2013]
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| Dans: |
European journal for philosophy of religion
Année: 2013, Volume: 5, Numéro: 1, Pages: 71-92 |
| Accès en ligne: |
Volltext (doi) Volltext (teilw. kostenfrei) |
| Édition parallèle: | Non-électronique
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| Résumé: | In a series of recent papers John martin Fischer argues that the so- called molinist solution to the problem of reconciling divine omniscience with human freedom does not offer such a solution at all. Instead, he maintains, molina simply presupposes theological compatibilism. However, Fischer construes the problem in terms of sempiternalist omniscience, whereas classical molinism adopts atemporalism. I argue that, moreover, an atemporalist reformulation of Fischers argument designed to show that molinism is not even consistent is unsuccessful as well, since it employs a transfer principle about causal inaccessibility that molina rightfully rejects. |
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| Contient: | Enthalten in: European journal for philosophy of religion
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.24204/ejpr.v5i1.249 |