In Defence of the Belief-Plus Model of Faith

I defend the claim that propositional religious faith that p implies belief that p. While this claim might seem trivial, it has been criticized by Alston, Pojman, Audi, and (more recently) McKaughan and Howard-Snyder. I begin by defending this view (call it the belief-plus model of faith) against fo...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:European journal for philosophy of religion
Main Author: Mugg, Joshua
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
Check availability: HBZ Gateway
Published: University of Innsbruck in cooperation with the John Hick Centre for Philosophy of Religion at the University of Birmingham [2016]
In: European journal for philosophy of religion
Year: 2016, Volume: 8, Issue: 2, Pages: 201-219
Standardized Subjects / Keyword chains:B Faith / Existence of God / Affirmation
IxTheo Classification:AB Philosophy of religion; criticism of religion; atheism
Online Access: Volltext (teilw. kostenfrei)
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Summary:I defend the claim that propositional religious faith that p implies belief that p. While this claim might seem trivial, it has been criticized by Alston, Pojman, Audi, and (more recently) McKaughan and Howard-Snyder. I begin by defending this view (call it the belief-plus model of faith) against four objections. In addition to criticizing the belief-plus model, each of the above philosophers have offered their own alternatives to the belief-plus model. I focus on McKaughan’s (2013) recent accounts of faith: ‘trusting acceptance’ and ‘hopeful affirmation’. I argue, following Howard-Snyder, that hopeful affirmation fails to give sufficient conditions for faith. I then argue that there is no reason to think that the token acceptances in faith as trusting acceptance are not instances of belief.
Contains:Enthalten in: European journal for philosophy of religion
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.24204/ejpr.v8i2.65