Aquinas and Naturalism

Aquinas’s actual response to a naturalistic challenge at St I.2.3 is one which most naturalists would find unimpressive. However, I shall argue that there is a stronger response latent in his philosophical system. I take Quine as an example of a methodological naturalist, examine the roots of his po...

Full description

Saved in:  
Bibliographic Details
Published in:European journal for philosophy of religion
Main Author: O'Grady, Paul (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
Check availability: HBZ Gateway
Fernleihe:Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste
Published: University of Innsbruck in cooperation with the John Hick Centre for Philosophy of Religion at the University of Birmingham [2011]
In: European journal for philosophy of religion
Online Access: Volltext (doi)
Volltext (teilw. kostenfrei)
Parallel Edition:Non-electronic
Description
Summary:Aquinas’s actual response to a naturalistic challenge at St I.2.3 is one which most naturalists would find unimpressive. However, I shall argue that there is a stronger response latent in his philosophical system. I take Quine as an example of a methodological naturalist, examine the roots of his position and look at two critical responses to his views (those of BonJour and Boghossian). If one adjusts some of the problematical aspects of their responses and establishes a hybrid position on the epistemology and metaphysics of an anti-naturalistic stance, it turns out to be the position Aquinas himself takes on meaning and knowledge.
Contains:Enthalten in: European journal for philosophy of religion
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.24204/ejpr.v3i2.401