Zagzebski on Rationality
This paper examines Linda Zagzebskis (2012) account of rationality, as set out in her rich, wide-ranging, and important book, Epistemic Authority: A Theory of Trust, Authority, and Autonomy in Belief. We briefly describe the account that she offers and then consider its plausibility. In particular,...
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Contributors: | |
Format: | Electronic Article |
Language: | English |
Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Published: |
University of Innsbruck in cooperation with the John Hick Centre for Philosophy of Religion at the University of Birmingham
[2014]
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In: |
European journal for philosophy of religion
Year: 2014, Volume: 6, Issue: 4, Pages: 39-46 |
Standardized Subjects / Keyword chains: | B
Zagzebski, Linda Trinkaus 1946-, Epistemic authority
/ Rationality
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RelBib Classification: | AB Philosophy of religion; criticism of religion; atheism |
Online Access: |
Volltext (doi) Volltext (teilw. kostenfrei) |
Summary: | This paper examines Linda Zagzebskis (2012) account of rationality, as set out in her rich, wide-ranging, and important book, Epistemic Authority: A Theory of Trust, Authority, and Autonomy in Belief. We briefly describe the account that she offers and then consider its plausibility. In particular, in the first section we argue that a number of Zagzebskis claims with regard to rationality require more support than she offers for them. Moreover, in the second section, we contend that far from offering Zagzebski a quick way of dealing with radical scepticism, her account of rationality actually seems to be particularly vulnerable to this problem. |
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Contains: | Enthalten in: European journal for philosophy of religion
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.24204/ejpr.v6i4.143 |