The Practice of Assertion under Conditions of Religious Ignorance
The knowledge and attendant justification norms of belief and assertion serve to regulate our doxastic attitudes towards, and practices of asserting, various propositions. I argue that conforming to these norms under conditions of religious ignorance promotes responsible acts of assertion, epistemic...
| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
University of Innsbruck in cooperation with the John Hick Centre for Philosophy of Religion at the University of Birmingham
[2017]
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| In: |
European journal for philosophy of religion
Year: 2017, Volume: 9, Issue: 1, Pages: 27-39 |
| Standardized Subjects / Keyword chains: | B
Faith
/ Self-assertion
/ Religion
/ Ignorance
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| RelBib Classification: | AB Philosophy of religion; criticism of religion; atheism AG Religious life; material religion |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (doi) Volltext (teilw. kostenfrei) |
| Summary: | The knowledge and attendant justification norms of belief and assertion serve to regulate our doxastic attitudes towards, and practices of asserting, various propositions. I argue that conforming to these norms under conditions of religious ignorance promotes responsible acts of assertion, epistemic humility, and non-dogmatic doxastic attitudes towards the content of ones own faith. Such conformity also facilitates the formation of the religious personality in a healthy direction in other ways. I explore these ideas in relation to the Christian faith tradition, but my reflections generalize. |
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| Contains: | Enthalten in: European journal for philosophy of religion
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.24204/ejpr.v9i1.1863 |