Wittgenstein and the 'Factorization Model' of Religious Belief
In the contemporary literature Wittgenstein has variously been labelled a fideist, a non-cognitivist and a relativist of sorts. The underlying motivation for these attributions seems to be the thought that the content of a belief can clearly be separated from the attitude taken towards it. Such a f...
| Auteur principal: | |
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| Type de support: | Électronique Article |
| Langue: | Anglais |
| Vérifier la disponibilité: | HBZ Gateway |
| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Publié: |
[2014]
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| Dans: |
European journal for philosophy of religion
Année: 2014, Volume: 6, Numéro: 1, Pages: 93-110 |
| Sujets / Chaînes de mots-clés standardisés: | B
Wittgenstein, Ludwig 1889-1951
/ Philosophie des religions
/ Contenu de la foi
/ Acte de foi
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| RelBib Classification: | AB Philosophie de la religion |
| Accès en ligne: |
Volltext (doi) Volltext (teilw. kostenfrei) |
| Résumé: | In the contemporary literature Wittgenstein has variously been labelled a fideist, a non-cognitivist and a relativist of sorts. The underlying motivation for these attributions seems to be the thought that the content of a belief can clearly be separated from the attitude taken towards it. Such a factorization model which construes religious beliefs as consisting of two independent factors - the beliefs content and the belief-attitude - appears to be behind the idea that one could, for example, have the religious attitude alone (fideism, non-cognitivism) or that religious content will remain broadly unaffected by a fundamental change in attitude (Kusch). In this article I will argue that such a factorization model severely distorts Wittgensteins conception of religious belief. |
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| Contient: | Enthalten in: European journal for philosophy of religion
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.24204/ejpr.v6i1.193 |
