Wittgenstein and the 'Factorization Model' of Religious Belief
In the contemporary literature Wittgenstein has variously been labelled a fideist, a non-cognitivist and a relativist of sorts. The underlying motivation for these attributions seems to be the thought that the content of a belief can clearly be separated from the attitude taken towards it. Such a f...
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| Medienart: | Elektronisch Aufsatz |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Verfügbarkeit prüfen: | HBZ Gateway |
| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Veröffentlicht: |
[2014]
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| In: |
European journal for philosophy of religion
Jahr: 2014, Band: 6, Heft: 1, Seiten: 93-110 |
| normierte Schlagwort(-folgen): | B
Wittgenstein, Ludwig 1889-1951
/ Religionsphilosophie
/ Glaubensinhalt
/ Glaubensakt
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| RelBib Classification: | AB Religionsphilosophie; Religionskritik; Atheismus |
| Online-Zugang: |
Volltext (doi) Volltext (teilw. kostenfrei) |
| Zusammenfassung: | In the contemporary literature Wittgenstein has variously been labelled a fideist, a non-cognitivist and a relativist of sorts. The underlying motivation for these attributions seems to be the thought that the content of a belief can clearly be separated from the attitude taken towards it. Such a factorization model which construes religious beliefs as consisting of two independent factors - the beliefs content and the belief-attitude - appears to be behind the idea that one could, for example, have the religious attitude alone (fideism, non-cognitivism) or that religious content will remain broadly unaffected by a fundamental change in attitude (Kusch). In this article I will argue that such a factorization model severely distorts Wittgensteins conception of religious belief. |
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| Enthält: | Enthalten in: European journal for philosophy of religion
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.24204/ejpr.v6i1.193 |
