First Person and Third Person Reasons in Religious Epistemology

In this paper I argue that there are two kinds of epistemic reasons. One kind is irreducibly first personal - what I call deliberative reasons. The other kind is third personal - what I call theoretical reasons. I argue that attending to this distinction illuminates a host of problems in epistemolog...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Zagzebski, Linda (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: University of Innsbruck in cooperation with the John Hick Centre for Philosophy of Religion at the University of Birmingham [2011]
In: European journal for philosophy of religion
Year: 2011, Volume: 3, Issue: 2, Pages: 285-304
Online Access: Volltext (doi)
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Summary:In this paper I argue that there are two kinds of epistemic reasons. One kind is irreducibly first personal - what I call deliberative reasons. The other kind is third personal - what I call theoretical reasons. I argue that attending to this distinction illuminates a host of problems in epistemology in general and in religious epistemology in particular. These problems include (a) the way religious experience operates as a reason for religious belief, (b) how we ought to understand religious testimony, (c) how religious authority can be justified, (d) the problem of religious disagreement, and (e) the reasonableness of religious conversion.
Contains:Enthalten in: European journal for philosophy of religion
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.24204/ejpr.v3i2.397