Human Autonomy and Theological Ethics
It is argued here that we have good reason to aspire to be autonomous in certain ways that deserve a place in the theory of virtue, but not in some of the ways that have figured most prominently in theories of moral obligation. This grounds an argument that the sorts of autonomy to which we have rea...
| Published in: | European journal for philosophy of religion |
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| Main Author: | |
| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
University of Innsbruck in cooperation with the John Hick Centre for Philosophy of Religion at the University of Birmingham
[2016]
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| In: |
European journal for philosophy of religion
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| Standardized Subjects / Keyword chains: | B
Free will
/ Theological ethics
/ Kant, Immanuel 1724-1804
/ Ethics
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| RelBib Classification: | AB Philosophy of religion; criticism of religion; atheism NCB Personal ethics |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (doi) Volltext (teilw. kostenfrei) |
| Summary: | It is argued here that we have good reason to aspire to be autonomous in certain ways that deserve a place in the theory of virtue, but not in some of the ways that have figured most prominently in theories of moral obligation. This grounds an argument that the sorts of autonomy to which we have reason to aspire need not be enemies of theological ethics. The focus is on the relation of autonomy to obligation in sections 1-4, and on the relation of autonomy to love in section 5. |
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| Contains: | Enthalten in: European journal for philosophy of religion
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.24204/ejpr.v8i3.1665 |