A dilemma for the soul theory of personal identity
The problem of diachronic personal identity is this: what explains why a person P at time T is numerically identical with a person P at a later time T, even if they are not at those times qualitatively identical? One traditional explanation is the soul theory, according to which persons persist in v...
Publié dans: | International journal for philosophy of religion |
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Auteur principal: | |
Type de support: | Électronique Article |
Langue: | Anglais |
Vérifier la disponibilité: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Publié: |
Springer Science + Business Media B. V
[2018]
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Dans: |
International journal for philosophy of religion
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Sujets / Chaînes de mots-clés standardisés: | B
Transmigration
/ Personne
/ Identité
/ Problématique de l'esprit et du corps
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Sujets non-standardisés: | B
Souls
B Persistence over time B Bodily and psychological continuity B Personal Identity |
Accès en ligne: |
Accès probablement gratuit Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
Résumé: | The problem of diachronic personal identity is this: what explains why a person P at time T is numerically identical with a person P at a later time T, even if they are not at those times qualitatively identical? One traditional explanation is the soul theory, according to which persons persist in virtue of their nonphysical souls. I argue here that this view faces a new and arguably insuperable dilemma: either (a) souls, like physical bodies, change over time, in which case the soul theory faces an analogue problem of diachronic soul identity, or (b) souls, unlike physical bodies, do not change over time, in which case the soul theory cannot explain why souls relate to particular bodies over time and so at best only partially explains personal identity. I conclude that the soul theory fares no better than physicalist-friendly accounts of personal identity such as bodily- or psychological-continuity-based views. |
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ISSN: | 1572-8684 |
Contient: | Enthalten in: International journal for philosophy of religion
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s11153-016-9594-x |