Divine freedom and contingency: an intelligibility problem for (some) theistic compatibilists
This article argues that the Theistic Compatibilist's typical understanding of what amounts to an intelligible, non-arbitrary free choice undermines God's freedom and the contingency of creation. I further suggest and reject four possible ways for Theistic Compatibilists to respond to this...
| Published in: | Religious studies |
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| Main Author: | |
| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Drawer...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
Cambridge Univ. Press
[2015]
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| In: |
Religious studies
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| Standardized Subjects / Keyword chains: | B
Theism
/ Omnipotence
/ Free will
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| RelBib Classification: | AB Philosophy of religion; criticism of religion; atheism |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (Verlag) Volltext (doi) |
| Summary: | This article argues that the Theistic Compatibilist's typical understanding of what amounts to an intelligible, non-arbitrary free choice undermines God's freedom and the contingency of creation. I further suggest and reject four possible ways for Theistic Compatibilists to respond to this problem in light of their metaphysical commitments to freedom and explanation. I close with discussion of a possible way for Theistic Compatibilists to avoid this problem. |
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| ISSN: | 1469-901X |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: Religious studies
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1017/S0034412514000419 |