Is theism a simple hypothesis? The simplicity of omni-properties
One reason for thinking that theism is a relatively simple theory - and that it is thereby more likely to be true than other theories, ceteris paribus - is to insist that infinite degrees of properties are simpler than extremely large, finite degrees of properties. This defence of theism has been ch...
| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Published: |
[2016]
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| In: |
Religious studies
Year: 2016, Volume: 52, Issue: 1, Pages: 45-61 |
| Standardized Subjects / Keyword chains: | B
Theism
/ Hypothesis
/ Simplicity of God
|
| RelBib Classification: | AB Philosophy of religion; criticism of religion; atheism |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (Publisher) Volltext (doi) |
| Summary: | One reason for thinking that theism is a relatively simple theory - and that it is thereby more likely to be true than other theories, ceteris paribus - is to insist that infinite degrees of properties are simpler than extremely large, finite degrees of properties. This defence of theism has been championed by Richard Swinburne in recent years. I outline the objections to this line of argument present in the literature, and suggest some novel resources open to Swinburne in defence. I then argue that scientists' preference for universal nomological propositions constitutes a very strong reason for supposing that theism is simpler than parodical alternatives in virtue of its positing omni-properties rather than parallel mega-properties'. |
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| ISSN: | 1469-901X |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: Religious studies
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1017/S0034412514000523 |
