Another look at Hume's treatment of the argument from design in the Natural History of Religion

This article argues that Hume's seemingly peculiar treatment of the argument from design in his Natural History of Religion is not indicative of a radical, or even modest, shift in his overall epistemic evaluation of it. His focus is on the argument's impact on the psychology of religious...

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Détails bibliographiques
Auteur principal: Kelahan, Emily (Auteur)
Type de support: Électronique Article
Langue:Anglais
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Publié: Cambridge Univ. Press [2016]
Dans: Religious studies
Année: 2016, Volume: 52, Numéro: 4, Pages: 461-474
Sujets / Chaînes de mots-clés standardisés:B Hume, David 1711-1776, Four dissertations / Religion naturelle / Téléologie
RelBib Classification:AB Philosophie de la religion
VA Philosophie
Accès en ligne: Volltext (Verlag)
Volltext (doi)
Description
Résumé:This article argues that Hume's seemingly peculiar treatment of the argument from design in his Natural History of Religion is not indicative of a radical, or even modest, shift in his overall epistemic evaluation of it. His focus is on the argument's impact on the psychology of religious believers, and not its rational acceptability. Hume never strays far from his stated intention for the work, to engage in a socio-psychological analysis of the nature of religious belief, including a thorough assessment of the role of the argument from design. Hume concludes that the argument is inconsequential to religious belief formation.
ISSN:1469-901X
Contient:Enthalten in: Religious studies
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1017/S0034412516000068