Classical theism and modal realism are incompatible
The classical conception of God is that of a necessary being. On a possible worlds semantics, this entails that God exists at every possible world. According to the modal realist account of David Lewis, possible worlds are understood to be real, concrete worlds - no different in kind from the actual...
| Auteur principal: | |
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| Type de support: | Électronique Article |
| Langue: | Anglais |
| Vérifier la disponibilité: | HBZ Gateway |
| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Publié: |
[2016]
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| Dans: |
Religious studies
Année: 2016, Volume: 52, Numéro: 4, Pages: 561-572 |
| Sujets / Chaînes de mots-clés standardisés: | B
Lewis, David K. 1941-2001
/ Modalité
/ Réalisme
/ Théisme
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| RelBib Classification: | AB Philosophie de la religion VB Herméneutique; philosophie |
| Accès en ligne: |
Volltext (Maison d'édition) Volltext (doi) |
| Résumé: | The classical conception of God is that of a necessary being. On a possible worlds semantics, this entails that God exists at every possible world. According to the modal realist account of David Lewis, possible worlds are understood to be real, concrete worlds - no different in kind from the actual world. But, modal realism is equipped to accommodate the existence of a necessary being in only one of three ways: (1) By way of counterpart theory, or (2) by way of a special case of trans-world identity for causally inert necessary beings (e.g. pure sets), or else (3) causally potent ones which lack accidental intrinsic properties. I argue that each of these three options entails unacceptable consequences - (1) and (2) are incompatible with theism, and (3) is incompatible with modal realism. I conclude that (at least) one of these views is false. |
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| ISSN: | 1469-901X |
| Contient: | Enthalten in: Religious studies
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1017/S003441251600010X |
