The metaphysics of belief: a Wittgenstein and Collingwood convergence

In this article I make plausible ‘a metaphysics of belief' by showing how Collingwood's metaphysics of absolute presuppositions helps us understand various comments and fragments by Wittgenstein regarding ‘the metaphysical subject'. For both, metaphysical beliefs are presuppositional;...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Religious studies
Main Author: Gilman, James Earl 1947- (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: Cambridge Univ. Press [2017]
In: Religious studies
Standardized Subjects / Keyword chains:B Collingwood, Robin G. 1889-1943 / Wittgenstein, Ludwig 1889-1951 / Faith / Metaphysics
RelBib Classification:AB Philosophy of religion; criticism of religion; atheism
VB Hermeneutics; Philosophy
Online Access: Volltext (Verlag)
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Description
Summary:In this article I make plausible ‘a metaphysics of belief' by showing how Collingwood's metaphysics of absolute presuppositions helps us understand various comments and fragments by Wittgenstein regarding ‘the metaphysical subject'. For both, metaphysical beliefs are presuppositional; as such, they constitute twin foci - a terminus ad quem and a terminus a quo - without which the activity of thinking rationally, scientifically, and morally is impossible. Finally, although for both philosophers metaphysical beliefs are not susceptible to conventional modes of explanation, justification, and verification, both seem to suggest in various ways that metaphysical beliefs are nevertheless susceptible to a certain kind of ‘practical' justification.
ISSN:1469-901X
Contains:Enthalten in: Religious studies
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1017/S0034412516000354