Revisionism, Scepticism, and the Non-Belief Theory of Hinge Commitments
In his recent work, Duncan Pritchard defends a novel Wittgensteinian response to the problem of radical scepticism. The response makes essential use of a form of non-epistemicism about the nature of hinge commitments. According to non-epistemicism, hinge commitments cannot be known or grounded in ra...
| Published in: | International journal for the study of skepticism |
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| Main Author: | |
| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
Brill
2018
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| In: |
International journal for the study of skepticism
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| Standardized Subjects / Keyword chains: | B
Pritchard, Duncan 1974-, Epistemic angst
/ Wittgenstein, Ludwig 1889-1951, Über Gewissheit
/ Scepticism
/ Epistemic modal logic
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| Further subjects: | B
hinge commitments
radical scepticism
philosophical disagreement
non-belief theory
conceivability
Moore’s paradox
Duncan Pritchard
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| Online Access: |
Volltext (Verlag) |
| Summary: | In his recent work, Duncan Pritchard defends a novel Wittgensteinian response to the problem of radical scepticism. The response makes essential use of a form of non-epistemicism about the nature of hinge commitments. According to non-epistemicism, hinge commitments cannot be known or grounded in rational considerations, such as reasons and evidence. On Pritchard’s version of non-epistemicism, hinge commitments express propositions but cannot be believed. This is the non-belief theory of hinge commitments (nbt). One of the main reasons in favour of nbt over rival anti-sceptical Wittgensteinian views is that it has less theoretical costs and revisionary consequences than its rivals. In this paper, I argue that nbt fares at least as bad as its rivals in terms of its theoretical costs and revisionism. In particular, I argue that nbt is inconsistent with certain cases of philosophical disagreement; that it faces worries with mental-state scepticism; and that it faces difficulties in explaining how we can represent ourselves as committed to hinge commitments. |
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| ISSN: | 2210-5700 |
| Contains: | In: International journal for the study of skepticism
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1163/22105700-20171272 |