Revisionism, Scepticism, and the Non-Belief Theory of Hinge Commitments
In his recent work, Duncan Pritchard defends a novel Wittgensteinian response to the problem of radical scepticism. The response makes essential use of a form of non-epistemicism about the nature of hinge commitments. According to non-epistemicism, hinge commitments cannot be known or grounded in ra...
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| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Drawer...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
Brill
2018
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| In: |
International journal for the study of skepticism
Year: 2018, Volume: 8, Issue: 2, Pages: 96-130 |
| Standardized Subjects / Keyword chains: | B
Pritchard, Duncan 1974-, Epistemic angst
/ Wittgenstein, Ludwig 1889-1951, Über Gewissheit
/ Scepticism
/ Epistemic modal logic
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| Further subjects: | B
hinge commitments
radical scepticism
philosophical disagreement
non-belief theory
conceivability
Moore’s paradox
Duncan Pritchard
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| Online Access: |
Volltext (Verlag) |