The Problem of Alternative Monotheisms: Another Serious Challenge to Theism
Theistic and analytic philosophers of religion typically privilege classical theism by ignoring or underestimating the great threat of alternative monotheisms.[1] In this article we discuss numerous god-models, such as those involving weak, stupid, evil, morally indifferent, and non-revelatory gods....
| Published in: | European journal for philosophy of religion |
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| Main Author: | |
| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
University of Innsbruck in cooperation with the John Hick Centre for Philosophy of Religion at the University of Birmingham
[2018]
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| In: |
European journal for philosophy of religion
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| Standardized Subjects / Keyword chains: | B
Monotheism
/ Gods
/ Theism
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| RelBib Classification: | AB Philosophy of religion; criticism of religion; atheism NCB Personal ethics |
| Further subjects: | B
Theism
B argument from alternative monotheisms B The Evil God Challenge B quasi-deism B Deism |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (doi) Volltext (teilw. kostenfrei) |
| Summary: | Theistic and analytic philosophers of religion typically privilege classical theism by ignoring or underestimating the great threat of alternative monotheisms.[1] In this article we discuss numerous god-models, such as those involving weak, stupid, evil, morally indifferent, and non-revelatory gods. We find that theistic philosophers have not successfully eliminated these and other possibilities, or argued for their relative improbability. In fact, based on current evidence - especially concerning the hiddenness of God and the gratuitous evils in the world - many of these hypotheses appear to be more probable than theism. Also considering the - arguably infinite - number of alternative monotheisms, the inescapable conclusion is that theism is a very improbable god-concept, even when it is assumed that one and only one transcendent god exists.[1] I take theism' to mean classical theism', which is but one of many possible monotheisms. Avoiding much of the discussion around classical theism, I wish to focus on the challenges in arguing for theism over monotheistic alternatives. I consider theism and alternative monotheisms as entailing the notion of divine transcendence. |
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| Contains: | Enthalten in: European journal for philosophy of religion
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.24204/ejpr.v10i1.1801 |