Abductive Reasoning and an Omnipotent God: A Response to Daniel Came
Daniel Came (2017) boldly argues that given certain assumptions, no omnipotent being can even in principle be the best explanation for some contingent state of affairs S. In this paper, I argue that (i) even given Came's assumptions, his argument rests crucially on a non sequitur, that (ii) he...
| Published in: | European journal for philosophy of religion |
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| Main Author: | |
| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
University of Innsbruck in cooperation with the John Hick Centre for Philosophy of Religion at the University of Birmingham
[2017]
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| In: |
European journal for philosophy of religion
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| Standardized Subjects / Keyword chains: | B
Came, Daniel
/ Omnipotence
/ Proof of God's existence
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| RelBib Classification: | AB Philosophy of religion; criticism of religion; atheism NBC Doctrine of God |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (doi) Volltext (teilw. kostenfrei) |
| Summary: | Daniel Came (2017) boldly argues that given certain assumptions, no omnipotent being can even in principle be the best explanation for some contingent state of affairs S. In this paper, I argue that (i) even given Came's assumptions, his argument rests crucially on a non sequitur, that (ii) he just assumes that the prior probability of God's existence is very low, and that (iii) his conclusions entail propositions that are very probably false. |
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| Contains: | Enthalten in: European journal for philosophy of religion
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.24204/ejpr.v9i4.1827 |